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From shadow boxing to Ghost Plane: English journalism and the War 
on Terror  
 
In my career as a journalist, there has never been a war on terror but 
a war of terror. John Pilger.1 
 
“In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the 
indefensible….This political language has to consist largely of 
euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. 
Defenceless villages are bombed from the air, the inhabitants driven 
out into the countryside, the cattle machine gunned, the huts set on 
fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of 
peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along roads with 
no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or 
rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, 
or shot in the back of the neck…this is called elimination of unreliable 
elements. Such phraselogy is needed if one wants to name things 
without calling up mental pictures of them.” George Orwell, ‘Politics 
and the English Language’. (1946). 
 
Rendition 
 
Arguably the finest example of investigative journalism during the ‘war 
on terror’ has been the exposure of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
‘extraordinary rendition’ programme. Probing journalists, whose 
researches were encapsulated by British journalist Stephen Grey’s 
book Ghost Plane in 2006, have painstakingly identified over 1000 CIA 
‘ghost flights’ criss-crossing the globe since 2001.2  Many of these 
flights were for ‘extraordinary rendition’ where terror suspects were 
secretly, without the suspect’s agreement, taken by force from one 
country to another and in some cases kidnapped.  
 
Rendition is exactly the kind of practice that journalists exist to expose 
as it is extrajudicial and involves nation states abusing fundamental 
human rights. These states seek to avoid the trial process. Rendition 
flights have not been used to move suspects from a war zones like 
Afghanistan or Iraq to the United States where these ‘terrorists’ could 
be charged and tried. The receiving nation was not the U.S. but a third 
                                                 
1 On 14 April 2006, the Heyman Center for the Humanities at Columbia University in New York brought 
together John Pilger, Seymour Hersh, Robert Fisk and Charles Glass for a discussion entitled 'Breaking the 
Silence: War, Lies and Empire'. 
2 Grey, Stephen (2006) Ghost Plane: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Secret Rendition Programme. pg vii, 
London: Hurst & Company, 
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country where the security services sympathetic to the U.S. and 
cooperative with the CIA. These third-party states are alleged to 
include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and Uzbekistan. Suspects were 
then incarcerated, interrogated, and in many cases tortured to extract 
their alleged knowledge of al Qaeda. Some of the suspects have died 
in custody.  It is estimated that at least one hundred ‘suspects’ have 
been ‘rendered’. 
 
As Bob Baer a former CIA operative in the Middle East has 
commented: “If you want a serious interrogation you send a prisoner 
to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured you send then to Syria. If 
you want someone to disappear......you send them to Egypt.”3 
 
The best documented and widely publicised case of extraordinary 
rendition is that of an Egyptian refugee in Italy named Osama Nasr, 
known more widely as Abu Omar.4 Council of Europe investigator, Dick 
Marty, later described the abduction of Abu Omar as a "perfect 
example of extraordinary rendition”.5 
 
In 2003 Abu Omar was an Iman who had been granted asylum and 
was living in Italy. (The Egyptians believed he belonged to al-Gama'a 
al-Islamiyya an organisation they had designated as illegal as its aims 
are said to include the overthrow of the democratically elected 
Egyptian government. It is considered a terrorist organization by the 
United States and European Union.) Abu Omar was suspected by the 
U.S. of plotting terrorist acts. 
 
On 17 February 2003 Abu Omar was walking along the street in Milan 
on his way to noon prayers at the local mosque. As he strolled along 
the Via Guerzoni, he was kidnapped by a CIA snatch team and bundled 
into a car. Abu Omar was taken to the air base at Aviano. Later that 
day he was flown in a U.S. Air Force jet to Ramstein airbase in 
Germany and there put on a a CIA hired aircraft and flown on to 
Egypt.  
 
The CIA plane landed at Cairo and Abu Omar was was put into the 
hands of Egyptian intelligence (the Mukhabarat). Abu Omar claimed he 
was tortured both by them and by State Security, Egypt’s feared 
secret police. He was kept locked up for many months and, he says, 
torture ranged from hanging him upside down and applying electric 
                                                 
3 Grey, Stephen (2004) U.S. accused of ‘torture flights', London: Sunday Times. 14/11/2004. 
4 Full given name: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, born 18/03/1963. 
5 Willey, David (2007) Italy secrets Threaten CIA trial, BBC News. 8/06/2007 
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shocks to genitals to putting him in a room where loud noise was 
played, damaging his hearing. He was interrogated as whether he was 
an al Qaeda militant. Then after thirteen months he was suddenly 
released and told to keep his mouth shut. An Egyptian court had ruled 
his imprisonment was "unfounded”.6 
 
What his CIA abductors had not reckoned with was that independent 
Italian prosecutors would not ignore these events. Prompted and 
assisted by journalists from a range of countries they began an 
inquiry. As a result we now know that a group of Italian secret service 
officials colluded with the CIA in the kidnap of Abu Omar.7 22 
European arrest warrants issued in December 2005 and Italian 
security service (SISM) officers were among those arrested. The 
Italian judge also issued arrest warrants for four Americans, three CIA 
agents and a U.S. Lieutenant Colonel who had been based at Aviano 
airport.  
The start of the trial was set for June 8, 2007, although it was 
adjourned until October 2007, pending an upcoming ruling by Italy's 
Constitutional Court regarding the possible violation of state secrecy 
laws by Milan prosecutors who used phone taps on Italian agents 
during their investigation.8  
Two others Italian suspects reached plea bargains.9  
The Italian legal authorities have asked the United States for the 
extradition of CIA operatives involved with the kidnapping. While it is 
almost inconceivable that the United States will concede these 
extraditions, the request has caused the White House no little 
embarrassment. His lawyer says he is now living in Egypt and has 
agreed to return to Italy to give evidence in the abduction trial. 
 
Abu Omar’s is only one of many cases of rendition, the details of which 
have been revealed as a result of painstaking forensic work by 
journalists.10 
                                                 
6 Nasrawi, Salah (2007) Egyptian kidnap victim ‘was tortured’. Independent News. 13/02/2007. 
7 Ghost Plane, pps 170-190 
8 The Middle East Times. (2007). CIA trial in Italy delayed to October,  24/06/2007. 
9 International Herald Tribune (2007) (AP Story) , Italy indicts 31 linked to CIA rendition case, 
16/02/2007 
10 Ghost Plane, pps 170-190 
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The United States continues to deny that it was engaged in rendition.  
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in an April 2006 radio 
interview that the United States does not transfer people to places 
where they know they will be tortured.11 
The exposure of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme and the 
collusion of other Governments around the world in this illegal and 
immoral practice has been one of the most successful episodes of 
investigative journalism in covering the ‘war on terror’ and its 
excesses.12 
 
As Ghost Plane author Stephen Grey, whose work on rendition has 
been pre-eminent, says:  
 
The outlines of the CIA’s rendition programme have emerged not 
from any single piece of reporting by a journalist or any single 
disclosure by a public official. Instead, details have come to light in 
a piecemeal fashion. Beat reporters like me who have followed this 
story have worked co-operatively – not in concert but by picking 
up pieces of the jigsaw puzzle disclosed by others, and then adding 
new pieces to the picture of what we know so far. Much more 
remains to be discovered.”13 
 
Indeed the question remains as whether the CIA had a secret network 
of ‘black’ prisons in European and other countries, where suspects 
where held and tortured. 
 
What is significant about the rendition story is that investigative 
journalists from around the world have cooperated in a way that has 
no precedent.  
 
The reporting of the war on terror has shown that reports of the death 
of investigative journalism are premature. Good investigative 
journalism has been at the forefront of revealing both the iniquities of 
terrorism and also the parallel illegalities of the war on terror. But 
separating investigative journalism from other reporting given the 
intense scrutiny of the war on terror can be difficult. And as we shall 
                                                 
11 Naughtie, James (2006) Interview of Secretary Rice With British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. BBC 
Radio 4's Today Programme 01/04/2006. 
12 European government including the British have been suspected of discretely assisting the CIA by 
allowing the flights to use their airports. 
13 Ghost Plane (2006) pg vii. 
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see not all reporting of this dark and depressing period has been 
inspired.  
 
There has been much discussion about an exact definition of 
investigative journalism. Elsewhere in this book Gavin McFadyean 
identifies research as the one key essence that distinguishes 
investigative journalism from other reporting. Another vital ingredient 
is that this research should result in a highly accurate piece of 
journalism, which usually contains information that someone, typically 
in a position of power, does not want public. It should stand the test of 
time and be in the public interest. 
 
What we can already say is that the landmark journalism on the 
rendition story was based on impressive research. The journalists 
involved went to great lengths to find and contact eyewitnesses, 
sources, participants, victims and experts. They obtained documents 
that were classified.  
 
Stephen Grey made great use of thousands of flight records and was 
astonished that he could eventually obtain on the exact movements of 
CIA planes.14 He obtained these both from his own confidential source 
with access to European air traffic records but also a worldwide 
network of planespotters and information released to subscription 
aviation databases by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. He also 
made sophisticated use of the relatively new art of computer aided 
journalism. He used a specialist computer programme to analyse the 
raw data and separate from the millions of routine flights the flights 
flown by CIA front companies to transport ‘suspects’ illegally. While 
rendition is a clear example of good investigative reporting, it is much 
harder to pick other examples in the complex and crowded media 
coverage of the war on terror in all its forms. 
 
Defining and separating investigative journalism from other reporting 
may appear on the surface to have the value of the arcane theological 
exercise of deciding how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. 
But the war on terror has produced so much poor and hasty reporting, 
and worse, disguised propaganda, that there is now a need for 
reflection on practices of contemporary journalism. In too many cases 
media organisations and journalists need to account for their past 
failings before the media can regain public trust in their reporting.  
 
                                                 
14 Grey, Stephen email to Lashmar, Paul (2007) 19/09/2007 
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Covering the war on terror has been among the most difficult and 
demanding jobs in journalism in recent history. Domestically, the 
probing journalist is up against the wilderness of mirrors created by 
the intelligence agencies and politicians. Terrorists are by their very 
nature secretive and their hinterlands, whether at home or abroad, are 
potentially dangerous places to operate. Covering Afghanistan, Iraq 
and the battlefields of this war has been more dangerous for 
journalists than any war before.  
 
War on Terror. 
 
The terror attacks of 11th September 2001 were a watershed, not least 
for the media. Before the attacks new organisations had limited 
curiousity about the Muslim world. That changed instantly after 9/11 
and the interest became instant and intense, with any subsequent lack 
of concentration refocused by another terror attack or political or 
military excess.  
 
With hindsight the warning signs were there but few in the media 
wanted to see them, confirming again the conformity of many 
contemporary media organisations in the West. Prior to 9/11 there had 
been an escalation of terror attacks aimed at Western targets, 
emanating from fundamentalist terror groups coalescing around the 
leadership of former Saudi citizen and former mujahedeen Osama bin 
Laden. These included the attacks on United States embassies in East 
Africa and the sea-borne attack on the U.S.S Cole off Yemen. There 
had been some reporting and some investigative journalism of these 
developments but certainly it was generally perceived in the UK media 
as far from centre stage news. 
 
With the hijacked airliners caught on video as they ploughed into the 
World Trade Center, the drama and impact of the attacks and 2950 
deaths on 11 September 2001 really justify use of the term; creating a 
new paradigm. The world was suddenly a very different place. Global 
attention fixed on a few acres of smouldering earth and rubble in the 
centre of Manhattan. The search, by governments and media alike, for 
the perpetrators of this unparalleled act of terror began instantly. All 
knew that the America would respond with force the only question was 
how that revenge would be framed. Within weeks in his address to a 
joint session of Congress following the attacks on September 11, U.S. 
President George W. Bush defined a ‘war on terror’: 
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Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. 
It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped and defeated.15 
 
In retrospect we can see the tone of reporting after 9/11 was set in 
reaction to the horror of the event which muted objective critical 
reporting. There was some critical reporting on whether the United 
States should have been better prepared and whether early warning of 
the attacks had been ignored by the U.S. authorities.  
 
Sir Harold Evans, the former Sunday Times Editor and New York 
resident, would later point to a string of failures by the American 
press, most especially in the months prior to 9/11. He was scathing 
about the fact that ‘not a single major newspaper’ took seriously 
enough the February 2001 report by Senators Rudman and Hart which 
gave warnings about the likelihood of a terrorist attack. 
 
He conceded that following 9/11 a wave of patriotism in the U.S. made 
criticism and dissent much harder. He said: "I felt rage myself. I was 
in New York". But it required the press to stand back and take stock 
rather than be caught up in the emotion.16 
 
There can be few events in history that have attracted as much media 
coverage as the 9/11 and the events stemming from it. How much of 
that coverage was objective could be described as investigative is 
more complicated. Investigative journalism usually thrives in places 
where there is little or no serious reporting. After 9/11 every decent 
journalist wanted to be engaged in what was clearly to be the most 
important story of the decade.  
 
U.S. journalists became preoccupied with a domestic story, the 
discovery of anthrax in various government buildings. For months 
reports suggested a range of suspects from Iraqis to al Qaeda.17 
 
In the wake of 9/11 various conspiracy theories emerged, mostly 
suggesting that the U.S. government covertly organised the attacks. 
Some conspiracy theorists have claimed that the collapse of the World 
Trade Center was the result of a controlled demolition. Some also 
                                                 
15 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html,"President Declares 
Freedom at War with Fear" 
16 Evans, Sir Harold (2006) Journalism under pressure – reporting terrorism speech by Sir Harold Evans, 
IPI world congress, Edinburgh. 2006. 
17 Six years on the culprit has never been conclusively identified. 
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contend that a commercial airliner did not crash into the Pentagon, 
and that United Airlines Flight 93 was shot down. Few of these claims, 
however, were taken seriously by mainstream journalists and were 
largely confined to the alternative media. Over time none of these 
theories have yet been shown to be compelling.18 As one respected 
journalist observed: “If you can’t trust your own media to tell you the 
truth you are more likely to believe in conspiracies.” WHO/WHERE 
 
 
In the UK investigative activity concentrated on the links between the 
9/11 plotters and their relationship with Britain. When a British 
national and convert to Islam, Richard Reid, was arrested in December 
2001 off a transatlantic flight having attempted to set off a bomb in his 
shoe, the focus for the UK media began to shift to the threat within the 
UK.19 
 
Many western journalists looked to the Muslim world, trying to 
establish the extent of the al Qaeda network and threat. In the 
atmosphere of shock and revenge the media were often uncritical if 
not outright supportive of the American led invasion of Afghanistan in 
the same month and the removal of al Qaeda’s mentors, the Taliban, 
from government.  
 
The world was taking on a new, more sinister shape, not least for 
inquiring journalists. “In the year since the September 11 attacks on 
the United States, the world has become a more uncertain place,” said 
Aidan White of the International Federation of Journalists at the end of 
2002.  “The declaration of ‘a war on terrorism’ by the United States 
and its international coalition has created a dangerous situation in 
                                                 
18 Some of the wilder conspiracy theories grew out of legitimate reporting. For instance just after 9/11 
Greg Palast and Meirion Jones of BBC2’s Newsnight programme were handed a secret FBI report showing 
that they’d been investigating the Bin Laden family but had been taken off the case both under Clinton 
and Bush. The agents were furious. What particularly annoyed the agents was that the Bin Laden’s had 
been flown out of the U.S. without proper questioning as soon as the “no-fly” ban had been lifted. The 
story got coverage in the UK but didn’t suit the legend that was being created in the U.S. at the time. 
Later the conspiracy theorists got hold of it and their version is that the Bin Ladens were flown out during 
the “no-fly” ban which of course is unlikely. 
19 According to al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (who was captured and interrogated in 
Oman in 2003), Reid was a member of al-Qaeda and had been sent on the bombing mission by Khaled 
Shaikh Mohammed, a senior member of the organization. 
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which journalists have become victims as well as key actors in 
reporting events.”20 
 
Following what then appeared to be the efficient and effective regime 
change in Afghanistan, the U.S. and UK governments brought the 
repressive dictatorship of Saddam Hussein under intense scrutiny and 
criticism. There was a feeling that the West had failed to tackle 
Saddam Hussein effectively at the end of the first Gulf War. But more 
pressing were the links to be made between Saddam and bin Laden 
that would justify an invasion.21 
 
From late 2001 we see the campaign by those governments to 
persuade their public and world opinion that Saddam Hussein had links 
with al Qaeda and that he was developing Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) that threaten U.S., UK and Western interests. 
These government claims were largely supported by media. While no 
one doubted the barbarity of Saddam’s regime, many journalists 
including took the extra step and accepted the neo-conservative 
perspective of Iraq as the dominant global threat.  
 
Observers worried about the media’s coverage after 9/11. Aidan 
White’s report for the International Federation of Journalists observed 
that media reporting in the UK tended to follow the political direction 
of the Government and was very pro American: “After September 11 
this tendency overrode everything else. Reporting the war aims of the 
coalition was uncritical and for a month or two dissenting voices were 
bitterly attacked. 
 
However, it must be stated that there has been some excellent 
coverage, and not just in the obvious paper, The Guardian, the 
leading liberal paper. In particular the Daily Mirror, the second 
highest circulating national paper, which had been totally ‘Blairite’, 
                                                 
20 White, Aidan (2002) ‘Journalism and the War on Terrorism: Final Report of the Aftermath of September 
11 and the implications for Journalism and Civil Liberties’, pg 2.International Federation of Journalists. 
03/09/2002 
21 When did the "War against terror" become a campaign against Saddam Hussein rather than Osama bin 
Laden? Less than a month after the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon, some hawkish members of the U.S. administration were stressing a connection with Iraq, but 
the shift did not become clear until George Bush's State of the Union address in January 2002, when the 
"axis of evil" was unveiled. Suddenly Baghdad was in the frame, and al-Qaeda took a temporary back 
seat. For some months the name of Bin Laden was hardly referred to by President Bush. He name-
checked al Qaeda in the 2003 State of the Union speech but its leader was not mentioned. Instead 
Washington has acted as though the link between Iraq and terrorism were self-evident. 
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converted itself to a critical position in March 2002 and has run 
some critical coverage, which has been widely welcomed among 
journalists.22 
 
White made a prescient comment:  
 
But the media need to resist the pressure of politicians who are 
willing to sacrifice civil liberties and press freedom to win their 
propaganda battles. The priority must always be the right to 
publish words and images – however unpalatable – that help 
people better understand the roots of the conflict. (ibid: pg2 ) 
 
Columnist, George Monbiot, later commented that the government 
position found support in surprising places. The Observer, he pointed 
out, published five articles claiming that there were “direct Iraqi links 
with the U.S. hijackers” who carried out the 9/11 attacks.23  One of 
them suggested that “Iraqi training, intelligence and logistics were 
hidden behind an Islamist facade”. Iraq, it claimed “ran a terrorist 
camp for foreign Islamists, where it taught them how to hijack planes 
with boxcutters”.24 
 
The worst offender, Monbiot claimed, was the Sunday Telegraph with a 
range of articles. For example, in September 2001, it opined that “the 
Iraqi leader had been providing al-Qaeda … with funding, logistical 
back-up and advanced weapons training. His operations reached a 
‘frantic pace’ in the past few months”.25 
 
Brutality - warning bells unheeded 
 
As in all wars, at the sharp end the military often did not behave in 
keeping with the high moral tone struck by their political leaders.  
 
                                                 
22 White, Aidan (2002) ‘Journalism and the War on Terrorism: Final Report of the Aftermath of September 
11 and the implications for Journalism and Civil Liberties, International Federation of Journalists. Published 
on September 3, 2002. 
23 Rose, David and Vulliamy, Ed (2001) U.S. hawks accuse Iraq over anthrax, The Observer, 
14/10/2001.; Rose, David, The Iraqi connection, The Observer, 11/11/2001; Rose, David, The case for 
tough action against Iraq, The Observer 2/12/ 2001; Rose, David, A blind spot called Iraq, The Observer, 
13/01/2002; Rose, David (2003) Spain links suspect in 9/11 plot to Baghdad, The Observer, 16/03/2003 
24 Monbiot, George (2004) The Lies of the Press on Monboit.com. 20 July 2004 
25 Berry, Jessica, Sherwell, Philip and Wastell, David. (2001) Army alert by Saddam points to Iraqi role,  
The Sunday Telegraph. 23/09/2001 
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In December 2002 came the first of what would become a long stream 
of allegations of brutality by allied forces towards prisoners in the war 
on terror. A Washington Post article by Dana Priest and Barton 
Gellman exposed the abuse of Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners, 
detailing a ‘brass-knuckled quest for information’ that includes ‘stress 
and duress techniques.’  
 
Americans with direct knowledge and others who have witnessed 
the treatment,’ the Post reported, said that ‘captives are often 
‘softened up’ by MPs and U.S. Army Special forces troops who beat 
them up and then confine them in tiny rooms.’ The paper also 
made an early mention of the practice of ‘extraordinary 
renditions’— shipping prisoners to countries where they can be 
tortured more freely.  One official who was ‘directly involved’ 
explained: ‘We don’t kick the [expletive] out of them. We send 
them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of 
them.26 
 
Little attention was paid to this story of brutality with its hint of the 
shape of things to come. In late 2002 the media’s reporting focussed 
on the increasing tension between the international team of weapons 
inspectors and the U.S. Government. 
  
Leading campaigning journalist John Pilger was already alarmed:  
 
The attempts by journalists in the U.S. and Britain, acting as 
channels for American intelligence, to connect Iraq to 11 
September have also failed. The ‘Iraq connection’ with anthrax has 
been shown to be rubbish; the culprit is almost certainly American. 
The rumour that an Iraqi intelligence official met Mohammed Atta, 
the 11 September hijacker, in Prague was exposed by Czech police 
as false. Yet press ‘investigations’ that hint, beckon, erect a straw 
man or two, then draw back, while giving the reader the overall 
impression that Iraq requires a pasting, have become a kind of 
currency. One reporter added his ‘personal view’ that ‘the use of 
force is both right and sensible’.27 
 
                                                 
26 Priest, Dana and Gellman, Barton, (2002) U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations Washington 
Post, Thursday, 26/12/2002; Page A01 
27 Pilger, John (2002) The Media and Iraq: A compliant press is preparing the ground for an all-out attack 
on Iraq’, 21/03/2002 www.johnpilger.com/page.asp?partid=395 
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In September the UK the government published a dossier, based on 
material from British intelligence, making the case that Saddam and 
Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. It had a foreword by then 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair which said:  
 
“The document discloses that his military planning allows for some 
of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use 
them.”28 
 
On 24 September 2002 Prime Minister Tony Blair told MPs the 
intelligence revealed that Saddam Hussein ‘has existing and active 
military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which 
could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia 
population.’29 The Evening Standard carried the headline ‘45 minutes 
from attack.’ The Sun carries the headline ‘Brits 45 mins from doom’ 
about the threat to troops in Cyprus. 
 
In early February televised briefings by U.S. Secretary for State Colin 
Powell at the UN detailed ‘evidence’ of weapons of mass destruction 
within Iraq is largely accepted by the media. Powell pointed to blown-
up aerial spy pictures purporting to show Saddam’s mobile biological 
warfare production facilities.  
 
Powell drew on the British Government’s second dossier on Iraq 
published in February 2003.30 It is worth noting that a week later the 
Government’s dossier was exposed by Glen Rangwala, a Cambridge 
academic and writer who has excellent investigative skills, to have 
been an extensive piece of plagiarism, mostly of old material. The 
Cabinet Office authors had lazily lifted material from three different 
sources on the internet most extensively from a postgraduate at the 
Monterey Institute. This ‘cut and paste’ document was given the 
lasting sobriquet the ‘dodgy dossier’.31 
 
                                                 
28 Iraq – Its infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation(or Iraq Dossier for short) was a 
2003 briefing document for the Labour government use. It was issued to journalists on 3 February by 
Alastair Campbell, then Tony Blair's Director of Communications and Strategy, and concerned Iraq and 
weapons of mass destruction. published 30 January 2003 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page1470.asp 
29 BBC News (2004) TimeLine: The 45-minute claim, 13/10/2004 
30 Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation (s and Strategy, and concerned 
Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. 
31 Channel 4 News (2003) 6 Feb 2003. 
 13 
As part of their case both the British and American governments made 
much of the earlier arrest of an alleged terrorist cell claimed to be 
planning a lethal ricin poison32 attack in Britain.  After the arrest of six 
men in 2002 in what was known as the ‘ricin plot’, the Sun claimed: 
“The men are thought to be linked to fanatical Algerian Islamic groups 
which are part of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network.”33 
 
Prime Minister Blair, David Blunkett, then minister responsible for 
internal security, and British senior police officers, emphasized that the 
plot was a threat from what they called a new and highly dangerous 
kind of terrorist. To back up their case for war, politicians suggested 
there was a clear link between Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, and 
terrorists planning chemical or biological attacks on targets in the 
west, including London. 
  
The ricin claims were used most strikingly by Colin Powell, the U.S. 
secretary of state, in his UN speech. Insisting "every statement I make 
today is backed up by sources, solid sources", Powell spoke of a 
"sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network".  
(These British and American claims were to look very different after 
the court case in 2005. 34) 
 
So it was these government presentations that set the tone for the 
launch of the second Gulf War. 
 
On 7 March 2003 Hans Blix, who had been recalled by Kofi Annan to 
head the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission, told the Security Council that a series of searches had 
found no evidence of mobile biological production facilities in Iraq. This 
received little media coverage.  
 
On 20 March American missiles bombed Baghdad, marking the start of 
a U.S.-led war to topple Saddam Hussein. In the following days U.S. 
and British ground troops entered Iraq from the south. 
                                                 
32 Ricin is a very toxic poison extracted from the castor bean, if inhaled, injected, or ingested, acting as a 
toxin by the inhibition of protein synthesis. There is no known antidote. 
33 Sullivan, Michael (2003) Factory of Death The Sun . 8/01/2003. 
34 The ‘ricin plot’ proved to be an embarrassment for the security services. As tests later showed there 
was no ricin. Only one person was found guilty, an Algerian who fatally stabbed a police officer during his 
arrest. Several other Algerians were acquitted. Supposed al Qaeda terror manuals had been lifted in large 
part from survivalist manuals openly published in the U.S.. The best account of the fiasco was written by 
investigative journalist Duncan Campbell who gave evidence for the defence see Campbell, Duncan (2005) 
The ricin ring that never was, The Guardian. 14/04/2005. 
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By 9 April U.S. forces had advanced into central Baghdad. Saddam 
Hussein's hold on the city was broken. 
 
On 1 May 2003 George W Bush landed on the aircraft carrier Abraham 
Lincoln. A huge poster hung from the ship’s bridge proclaiming ‘Mission 
accomplished’. In the subsequent press conference to the world the 
U.S. President declared that ‘major combat operations in Iraq have 
ended.’ ‘The Battle for Iraq’ he added, ‘is one victory in a war on terror 
that began on September the 11th 2001 and still goes on.’35 
 
The Hutton Inquiry 
 
Reporting in the Britain in the immediate post invasion period was 
greatly influenced by a confrontation between the BBC and the 
government. On 29 May 2003 BBC Radio4’s Today programme defence 
correspondent Andrew Gilligan said in a early morning two way 
interview that he had a senior source, who had said the 45-minute 
claim was the ‘classic example’ of how the dossier was ‘sexed up’.36  
 
Regarded as a talented investigator with the ability to conduct deep 
research, Gilligan had been probing the government’s case for war. 
The Prime Minister’s office especially objected when the BBC reporter 
said that the Prime Minister’s office ‘probably knew’ the claim was 
wrong when it was put in the dossier. 
  
It was the Prime Minister’s Head of Communications (and right hand 
man), Alistair Campbell, who took Gilligan’s allegations most 
personally. Campbell was, to use that colourful cliché, ‘incandescent 
with rage’. On the 6 June he sent a four-page denunciation of Gilligan’s 
reporting to BBC Director of News Richard Sambrook. 
 
Campbell’s letter ends with: 
On the word of a single, uncorroborated source, you have allowed 
one reporter to drive the BBC’s coverage. We are left wondering 
why you have the guidelines at all, given they are so persistently 
breached without any comeback whatsoever.”37 
 
                                                 
35 BBC News (2003) Bush declares victory in Iraq, BBC News online 02/05/2003 
36 We now know the source to have been David Kelly a leading British WMD expert and former arms 
inspector. A transcript of the Gilligan broadcast can be found at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/03/hutton_inquiry/hutton_report/html/chapter02.stm#a9 
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Over the next few weeks a battle of wills raged. The Prime Minister’s 
office demanded an apology and the BBC refused to give it. The 
strength of reaction from the Prime Minister’s office against the BBC 
over this broadcast was compelling. It influenced not only BBC 
correspondents but other journalists’ views on the claims for the 
existence of WMD. The Foreign Office and other government 
departments continued to brief that there were WMD in Iraq and this 
remained the overriding priority for war. 
 
But then the drama cranked up when, on 17 July, the apparent source 
of Gilligan’s claim, government scientist David Kelly, was found dead. 
By most accounts he had committed suicide, following his treatment 
by Parliamentary investigators and by his civil service colleagues. 
Prime Minister Blair quickly proposed an independent judicial inquiry 
'urgently to conduct an investigation into the circumstances 
surrounding the death of Dr Kelly'.  
 
To conduct the inquiry Blair chose Lord Hutton, a senior judge.  A key 
witness was John Scarlett, the head of the leading branch of British 
intelligence services, MI6, who defended the controversial 45-minute 
claim at the inquiry, calling it ‘well-sourced intelligence’ but said it 
concerned munitions, mortar shells or similar weapons, not missile 
warheads.  
 
When he reported in January 2004 Lord Hutton was very critical of the 
BBC’s journalism and management of news.38 Among the inquiry’s 
conclusions were: 
 
 BBC claims that Downing Street ‘sexed-up’ the dossier on 
Iraqi weapons was ‘unfounded’. 
 Reporter Andrew Gilligan was wrong to claim Number 10 
inserted intelligence knowing it was suspect. 
 
Lord Hutton went further, calling BBC editorial procedures that allowed 
the report to be broadcast ‘defective’. Worse for the Corporation, he 
criticised both managers and governors for not investigating the 
Government's complaints quickly and fully. After Lord Hutton reported, 
Alistair Campbell, made his feelings clear: 
“If the Government faced the level of criticism…. which today     
Lord Hutton has directed to [sic] the BBC, there would clearly have 
been resignations by now.  Several resignations at several levels. 
Today the stain on the integrity of the prime minister and the 
                                                 
38 The report can be found at the Hutton Inquiry website: http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/ 
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government has been removed”39 
 
Despite initial resistance within days both the Chairman of the BBC  
Governors Gavin Davies and the BBC Director General Greg Dyke 
resigned. Andrew Gilligan departed too. What did surprise many 
observers was not Lord Hutton’s criticism of the BBC but his reticence 
to criticise the way the government had operated, especially over the 
writing of the Iraq dossier.40  The Hutton inquiry served, at the very 
least, to distract the media from events in the Middle East and Iraq in 
particular. There was for time a dampening of the media’s spirit of 
inquiry into the circumstances around the invasion of Iraq.  
 
The Hutton Affair left the BBC vulnerable. Many felt the humbled 
organization was avoiding any further confrontation with the 
Government. It was open season for attacks on the BBC for lacking 
patriotism. It is notable that the rest of the media were harshly critical 
of the BBC’s failing, yet in most cases their own reporting standards, 
especially in newspapers, would not have withstood the same intense 
scrutiny. 
 
Over the next few months the BBC came under attack by politicians 
and some of the media for its alleged anti-war coverage. The perfidy of 
these attacks was demonstrated by a later Cardiff University report 
that showed that the BBC “displayed the most ‘pro-war’ agenda of any 
broadcaster.”41 
 
The BBC has also been criticized for being too pro Government. One 
target was the BBC’s flagship current affairs programme, Panorama, 
whose investigation had provided support for the Government’s 
position prior to the Iraq invasion. In the Australian Financial Review, 
Brian Toohey, his country's most distinguished investigative journalist, 
reminded readers that Panorama on 23 September 2002 claimed to 
have ‘hard evidence’ about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. "It did 
                                                 
39 Wells, Matt; White, Michael and Wintour, Patrick (2004) Crisis cuts through the BBC, The Guardian 
29/01/2004 
40 Hutton’s absolution of the British Government was a genuine surprise even to ministers who could not 
believe their good luck. Whitehall experts said they had expected a 'massively destructive week for the 
establishment'. Most were convinced the judge to spread the blame across the field, though criticising 
Gilligan more than most. 
Ministers and officials were exonerated from any wrongdoing, or as Hutton put it from anything 
'dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous'. 
 
41 ‘Study deals a blow to claims of anti war bias in BBC news’, by Matt Wells, The Guardian, 4 July 2003. 
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no such thing," wrote Toohey. "Instead, it presented a load of 
nonsense which bolstered the case for subsequent invasion. One of the 
programme's prime sources was an Iraqi, Adnan Seead al-Haideri 
whom it described as 'credible'. He claimed that a secret biological 
weapons laboratory existed under a major hospital in Baghdad. 42 
 
The programme’s reporter Jane Corbin summed up: “So the new 
weapons and technology have been hidden away in heavily populated 
areas, even under a hospital in Baghdad according to Haideri.  
Beneath Saddam’s many presidential palaces too, and weapons are 
constantly on the move to outwit the vigilant spy planes.” 
 
“Haideri’s most harrowing account comes from people forced to work 
inside the secret weapons programme. They’ve told him Saddam’s 
ordered the testing of chemical weapons on prisoners.”43 
 
John Pilger commented, “That edition of Panorama was not untypical 
of the BBC's coverage of the build-up to the invasion, and the ‘war on 
terror’, or indeed any war fought or supported by the British 
establishment in living memory.”44 Pilger also cites Cardiff University 
report showed that 90 per cent of the BBC's references to weapons of 
mass destruction suggested that Saddam Hussein actually possessed 
them.45 
 
In the New Year of 2004 Panorama transmitted a programme on the 
Hutton Inquiry that was critical of their former colleague Andrew 
Gilligan. Reporter John Ware concluded: “The BBC still insists it got its 
story largely right – despite some flawed reporting.” 46 
 
The same team some weeks later went on to analyze the intelligence 
failure that had lead to the Iraq war. At the end of the programme, 
reporter John Ware said:  
 
                                                 
42 Toohey, Brain (2004) Australian Financial Review. 31 January 2004 
43 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/panorama/transcripts/23_09_02.txt 
 
44 Pilger, John (2004) John Pilger argues that Gilligan was an exception. 09/02/2004. News Statesman 
45 Lewis. J., Brookes, R., Mosedell, N. and Threadgold, T (2006) Shoot first and ask questions later: 
media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War, New York: Peter Lang. One of the report’s authors, Justin Lewis 
says; “Pilger's quote gets the spirit but loses the detail. The actual figure is 89%, and refers to all British 
broadcasters, not just the BBC (whose record here is better than the others, the worst offenders being 
Sky).  
46 BBC1 (2004) “A fight to the death” Panorama  Special. 21/01/2004 
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“The war has been over for 15 months.  Iraqis have been liberated 
from a tyrant.  But the military objective was to disarm him of his 
weapons of mass destruction.  No weapons have yet been found.  The 
cost has been countless injured and perhaps 11,000 dead.  But already 
a key bit of the case for war has officially been withdrawn by MI6.  
We've been told by a reliable intelligence source whose identity we 
have to protect, that MI6 no longer trusts its report that underpinned 
the dossier's claim that ‘Iraq has continued to produce chemical and 
biological agents.’47  
 
To this day seasoned reporters from across the media consider that 
the BBC and C4 current affairs departments lost their nerve in the 
wake of the Hutton inquiry. Some say the BBC would not tackle 
controversial subjects. Some insiders say this lasted a year after 
Hutton, others say longer.  
 
There is broad view that both organisations failed to deliver as broad a 
range of challenging programmes on the war on terror that you might 
have expected. Executives of both organizations I have spoken to deny 
such claims. BBC Journalists are categorical that the BBC avoided 
controversial items on Iraq in the months after Hutton. BBC journalists 
now deny lack of post Hutton journalistic vigour. One BBC journalist 
remarked: “…….they genuinely seem to have convinced themselves 
like a bunch of UFO alien abductees.” 
 
The truth will out 
 
The tide was turning; the government and intelligence service’s 
credibility further plummeted after the failure to find any WMD in Iraq. 
By September 2004 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was also forced to 
admit to Parliament that MI6 had withdrawn the 45 minute claim. 
 
Meanwhile in the United States the justifications for the invasion were 
also being unpicked.48 The United States also had it own scandal, a 
                                                 
47 BBC1 (2004) “A failure of intelligence?” Panorama. 11/07/04. 
48 The task of challenging the Saddam/al Qaeda link first fell to the leading U.S. investigative reporter 
Seymour Hersh, whose track record goes back to the revealing the My Lai massacre in 1969. Hersh 
reported in The New Yorker, in October 2003, (as early as????) "it was understood by many in the White 
House that the President had decided, in his own mind, to go to war." Hersh added, "The undeclared 
decision had a devastating impact on the continuing struggle against terrorism. The Bush Administration 
took many intelligence operations that had been aimed at Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups around the 
world and redirected them to the Persian Gulf. Linguists and special operatives were abruptly reassigned, 
and several ongoing anti-terrorism intelligence programs were curtailed." Then he focussed on the role of 
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complicated affair centring around the New York Times reporter Judith 
Miller, who had been at the forefront of reporting the existence of 
WMD in Iraq. It later turned out that her sources consisted of officials 
close to the neo-conservatives at the heart of the Bush administration 
and also the Chalabi camp of exiled Iraqis, now discredited for 
providing unreliable intelligence from within Iraq.49 
 
Home Grown 
 
Meanwhile British public attention was dramatically drawn to more 
domestic aspects of terrorism. After 9/11 there was little doubt that 
the UK was a target for al Qaeda inspired terrorism.  There was clear 
and increasing danger from bin Laden’s supporters looking to attack 
high profile targets in the UK.  
 
Initially the concern was that such attacks would be conducted by non 
indigenous Muslims. MI5 sought potential terror plots among those 
who were citizens of the Middle East and North Africa, while not 
discounting the odd indigenous maverick in the shoe bomber mould.  
 
Following the raid on the Finsbury Park mosque in January 2001, The 
Evening Standard reported: “Scotland Yard is now liaising with French 
and American intelligence agencies in connection with recent arrests. 
Other north African countries are also believed to be involved in the 
terror conspiracy. Members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Iraqi leader in exile, Ahmed Chalabi, who was subsequently revealed as an arch manipulator and purveyor 
of skewed intelligence. "Chalabi's defector reports [are] now flowing from the Pentagon directly to the 
Vice-President's office, and then on to the President, with little prior evaluation by intelligence 
professionals." The piece quoted Greg Thielmann, top intelligence official for the State Department, as 
saying, "There was considerable scepticism throughout the intelligence community about the reliability of 
Chalabi's sources, but the defector reports were coming all the time. Knock one down and another comes 
along. Meanwhile 
49 Judith Miller was based in Washington D.C and close to leading Government officials. She became well 
known through her involvement in two stories. Firstly about Iraq’s alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) Program. Secondly for her involvement in the Plame Affair.. Miller announced her retirement from 
The New York Times on November 9, 2005. In July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court for 
refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA 
agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but was said to be in possession of evidence relevant to the leak 
investigation. After her release on September 29, 2005, Miller agreed to testify to the grand jury the 
identity of her source, Lewis Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff. Miller and Bill Keller, 
executive editor of The New York Times, have not disclosed to the New York Times Miller's role in covering 
the Plame story. Miller now works at the Los Angeles Times. 
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well as Tunisians with links to extremist groups are believed to be 
under investigation.”50 
 
But as plot after plot was detected attention moved to British born 
terror suspects. Britain’s involvement with the Iraq invasion and its 
perceived anti-Islamic stance clearly provoked many young indigenous 
Muslims to align themselves with al Qaeda.  
 
The result was the 7/751 and 21/752 attacks of 2005 which appeared to 
be organized entirely by ‘home grown’ Muslims.53 The Prime Minister 
and his cabinet maintained that his alliance with the U.S. and the 
invasion of Iraq had played no part in the radicalization of British born 
Muslims. To their credit the majority of media have never accepted 
this perverse political logic. 
 
Meanwhile back in Iraq…. 
  
Reports from Iraq after the invasion were producing a string of stories 
alleging brutality by British troops during and after the invasion period. 
Many troops were later to face court martial. But attention was 
beginning to focus on U.S. internment camps. The key camp was Abu 
Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Correctional Facility, which housed 
prisoners suspected of Baathist and al Qaeda connections and staffed 
by U.S. military intelligence units notably the 372nd Military Police 
Company. 
 
In the one of the first reports the Associated Press said that detainees 
in Iraq were being subjected to torture and inhumane living conditions 
and told of an instance where a prisoner was shot and killed. The 
article reported the story of one prisoner, Saaed Naif, who said he saw 
                                                 
50 Davenport, Jason and Dovkants, Keith (2003) Mosque Linked to Key Terror Network,  Evening 
Standard. 21-01-2003. 
51 The 7 July 2005 London bombings were a series of coordinated terrorist bomb blasts that hit London's 
public transport system during the morning rush hour. At 8:50 a.m., three bombs exploded within fifty 
seconds of each other on three London Underground trains. A fourth bomb exploded on a bus nearly an 
hour later at 9:47 a.m. in Tavistock Square. The bombings killed 52 commuters and the four suicide 
bombers, injured 700 
52 On 21 July 2005, a second series of four explosions took place on the London Underground and a 
London bus. The detonators of all four bombs exploded, but none of the main explosive charges 
detonated, and there were no casualties. All suspected bombers from this failed attack escaped from the 
scenes but were later arrested. A number of men have been tried 
53 The suicide bombers are not around to tell their side of 7/7. At the time of writing a number of men 
were standing trial for the 21/7 and are innocent unless proven guilty by the jury. 
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another prisoner ‘shot dead at Abu Ghraib when he approached the 
razor wire.’ Many former prisoners of the detainment centers agreed 
that some of the worst atrocities at the prisons were the guards’ 
treatment of the women, sick, and disabled.54  
 
The full horror of Abu Ghraib was to be told by Seymour Hersh in the 
New Yorker magazine.55 As journalist Nick Davies points out that 
Seymour Hersh’s investigative reporting on the war on terror has been 
exemplary not least on Abu Ghraib: “Generally, Seymour Hersh has 
been there way out in front of just everybody and although CBS ran 
the Abu Ghraib pictures before him, its clear they were dithering and 
eventually put them out only because they heard that he was about to 
run them in the New Yorker.”56 
 
The photographs of Lynndie England, Charles Graner and other 
American military personnel degrading Iraqi detainees are so casual 
yet so debased as to have caused immeasurable worldwide damage to 
the United States’ claims to morality of purpose in Iraq. In its pursuit 
of a war on terror the Bush Administration has been accused of acting 
in violation of international law, human rights, and the U.S. 
Constitution in its execution of the campaign, particularly with regard 
to the internment of prisoners of war (or ‘illegal combatants‘) in its 
military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  
 
In Iraq the situation after the invasion gradually deteriorated. 
Investigations by the media show that neither the U.S. or UK had 
thought through their post invasion strategy. The only people to 
benefit were corrupt Iraqis in positions of power and the Western 
private security companies who were paid hundreds of millions of 
dollars to protect key installations and personnel.57 
 
The insurgency grew in strength and increasingly Iraq was referred to 
as suffering a Civil War. The media received no special treatment or 
quarter. Most news organizations were forced to remain in a specially 
protected ‘Green Zone’ in Baghdad for fear of kidnapping, torture and 
murder.  
 
                                                 
54 Associated Press, 11/3/2003 
55 Hersh, Seymour (2004)New Yorker magazine, May 2004. 
56 Davies, Nick to Paul Lashmar Email. 28 January 2007 
57 Secrets of the Iraq War, (2004) TV documentary by Films of Record for ITV. Producer Ed Harriman. 1 
hour Jan 2004 
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Reporting in Iraq has on the occasion shown again the difficulties of 
separating out investigative reporting from other good reporting. 
There has been some exceptional revealing and courageous reporting 
from foreign correspondents on the ground.  
 
As Noam Chomsky commented:  
 
The scale of the catastrophe in Iraq is so extreme that it can 
barely be reported. Journalists are largely confined to the heavily 
fortified Green Zone in Baghdad, or else travel under heavy guard. 
There are a few regular exceptions in the mainstream press, such 
as Robert Fisk and Patrick Cockburn, who face extreme hazards, 
and there are occasional indications of Iraqi opinion.”58  
 
Reporters have taken tremendous personal risk to deliver detailed 
and disturbing reports on the failure of the U.S. led alliance to 
transform Iraq into a peaceful democratic society. These reporters 
are seen as foreign correspondents but their work is heavily 
researched and accurate. 
 
Head of current affairs at C4, Dorothy Byrne, says:  
 
“Our key pieces on Iraq have tended not to be investigations (although 
we have made good films like Iraq’s Missing Billions) but reportage 
and analysis.  It has been so difficult to show what is really happening 
in Iraq that this form of current affairs – working with Iraqis to show 
the truth on the ground – has been important and influential. 
Politicians have tried to claim that there was not civil war and finding 
ways to get out there and show people just how normal civil society 
was falling apart has been key.”59 
 
Investigations 
  
For this chapter I conducted a straw poll of some of the UK’s 
investigative reporters and editors. The question I asked was: ‘What 
do you think is the most important contribution investigative 
journalism has brought to the Iraq War and the war on terror coverage 
in the last couple of years? I asked them to look from a primarily a UK 
perspective. 
 
                                                 
58 Chomsky, Noam (2006) Failed States’, Noam Chomsky, Penguin, pg 52 
59 Byrne, Dorothy email to Lashmar, Paul  Feb 2007 
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A number of stories were repeatedly cited. Top of that list by far was 
the coverage of ‘extraordinary rendition’. There was also general 
agreement that former Sunday Times journalist Stephen Grey has 
undertaken outstanding work on rendition. The approach to the 
rendition story has moved the practice of investigative journalism a 
step forward, in a variety of ways including innovative use of computer 
aided journalism and cooperation by journalists in many different 
countries. Stephen Grey has shown how an effective freelance 
investigative journalist can work across the media and national 
boundaries. It shows that journalists can improvise a global response 
to stories that transcend any one country. 
 
Another important story that was acclaimed in the straw poll was 
former Daily Telegraph defence correspondent Michael Smith’s 
‘Downing Street memo’ story.60 This was the leak of a document 
clearly from a highly placed source revealing that Tony Blair was intent 
on an invasion of Iraq much earlier than he had admitted. But this 
story raises an interesting point. Using Gavin McFadyean’s criteria of 
research, this story is a leak and is difficult to see it as investigative 
reporting. An excellent example of leak based journalism and a great 
piece of journalism but not an investigation.  
 
The importance of this and other documents leaked from Whitehall 
was summed up later by The Guardian’s security editor, Richard 
Norton-Taylor:  
 
The full extent of Tony Blair's mendacity over the invasion of Iraq 
has been emphatically revealed in classified Downing Street 
documents leaked since the invasion. They make up a devastating 
indictment of the way we were led into an adventure with the U.S. 
whose bloody consequences show no sign of relenting.61 
 
 
Other UK stories suggested include: 
 
 The exposure as false of the claim that Saddam Hussein had 
sought ‘yellowcake’ unrefined uranium ore from Niger as part of 
                                                 
60 Smith, Michael (2005) Blair hit by new leak of secret war plan,  pg1,  Sunday Times. 1/05/2005 
61 Norton-Taylor, Richard (2007) Memo to Mendacity: Blair subverted the truth to take us to war, 
Comment section. The Guardian. Thursday 17/04/2007. 
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a nuclear weapon development programme. The Independent on 
Sunday’s coverage has been influential.62 
 Revealing the Attorney General’s advice on the Iraqi invasion a 
story which Channel 4 News excelled. C4 News obtained a leak 
of the vital advice to then Prime Minister Tony Blair on which the 
nation had gone to war. The leak revealed the Attorney 
General's original advice was full of caveats that were stripped 
out of the summary he gave to Parliament.  
 BBC2’s nightly current affairs programme Newsnight has 
produced some illuminated reports not least that suicide bomber 
Mohammed Siddique Khan was under surveillance by the 
security services a year before the 7/7 suicide attacks.63 
 Reporting of troop shortages, kit shortages and failure to provide 
‘hard skinned’ transport for military operations in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.64 
 The exposure of the rescue of female U.S. soldier Private Jessica 
Lynch during the Iraq invasion as false and U.S. military PR 
exercise.65 
 
 
Alex Thomson of C4 News believes that media coverage of military 
operations have highlighted political failures: “In Afghanistan the 
persistent inquiry into general overstretch and under-supply of critical 
equipment in both Afghanistan firstly and Iraq too has been very 
effective in calling the government to account and I suspect – created 
the climate of unsackability which allows people like Dannant to say 
what they said.66 67 
 
Much coverage of the U.S. government’s Guantanamo Bay detention 
camp on Cuba has been driven by British journalists, including David 
                                                 
62 Whitaker, Raymond and Buncombe, Andrew (2007) How an article in the 'IoS' led to the conviction of 
Lewis 'Scooter' Libby The Independent on Sunday 11/02/2007  
63 BBC2 (2005) 7 July bomber ‘filmed in 2004’, Newsnight - reporter Richard Watson  25/10/2005 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/uk_terror_threat/default.stm 
64 Shipman, Tim (2002) Fighting forces hit by shortfalls in Equipment and medical care; Scandal of our 
khaki heroes in tattered trousers. Sunday Express pg 4 05/04/2002; Hickley, Matthew (2003) They’ve got 
the courage, Mr Blair, but have given them the equipment? Daily Mail Pg 1&5 22/01/2003 
65 BBC2 (2003) War Spin, presented by John Kampfner and produced by Sandy Smith, Sunday 18 May 
2003. 
66 Lt Gen Sir Richard Dannant, the Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corp from 2003 
67 Thomson, Alex email to Lashmar, Paul (29 Jan 2007) 
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Rose at The Observer although some U.S. colleagues have undertaken 
fine investigations.68 
 
U.S. stories to consider: 
 
* The exposure of the Bush administration exaggeration and misuse of 
intelligence provided by the informant ‘Curveball’, an Iraqi defector 
was written by Bog Drogin and John Goetz in the Los Angeles Times.69 
The investigation revealed that the source claiming to have seen 
mobile bioweapons labs was the brother of one of the senior aides to 
Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, who boasted 
how the erroneous information provided by his group achieved his 
long-cherished goal of toppling Saddam. 
 
Curveball, was an asset of German intelligence and was never directly 
interviewed by U.S. officials. The Pentagon and the Central Intelligence 
Agency did not even know exactly who he was, the LA Times 
reported.70 This first-hand intelligence source on Saddam Hussein’s 
alleged mobile bioweapons labs was a politically motivated Iraqi 
defector now dismissed as an “out-and-out fabricator”. The mobile 
labs, since exposed by weapons inspectors as hydrogen production 
facilities at best and phantoms at worst, were one of the centrepieces 
of the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s prewar address to the 
United Nations.  
 
Discussion 
 
There are many questions about the reporting of the ‘war on terror’. 
Could the British media have warned the public before the Iraq 
invasion that there were no WMD? In the face of such relentless 
government claims that WMD existed it was hard to challenge. Perhaps 
the best response on WMD comes from Hans Blix the UN Weapons 
Inspector who was later vilified by the U.S. for not finding WMD. “In 
the autumn of 2002 I still thought there were Weapons of Mass 
                                                 
68 Guantanamo Bay detainment camp is a joint military prison and interrogation camp under the 
leadership of Joint Task Force Guantanamo since 2002.[1] The prison, established at Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base, holds people suspected by the executive branch of the U.S. government of being al-Qaeda 
and Taliban operatives, as well as those no longer considered suspects who are being held pending 
relocation elsewhere. The detainment areas consist of three camps in the base: Camp Delta (which 
includes Camp Echo), Camp Iguana, and the now-closed Camp X-Ray. The facility is often referred to as 
Guantanamo, Gitmo (derived from the abbreviation "GTMO"), or Camp X-Ray. 
69 Drogin, Bob and Goetz, John (2005) The Curveball Saga, Los Angeles Times  20-21/11/2005, 
70 The Curveball Saga (2005) 
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Destruction’. As he pointed out it is hard to prove a negative. But he 
went on to say: “It is extraordinary that the intelligence services of the 
World’s most advanced nations made such a major error.”71 
 
It is clear that reporting of the war on terror has not always been of 
the highest standard, sometimes it was plain wrong and sometimes it 
hid behind the coattails of unidentified sources.  
 
Perhaps the most controversial piece of investigative reporting in the 
UK was Andrew Gilligan’s famous report. Many reporters believe that 
Gilligan’s methods were not always proper or professional and he put 
the source in danger of exposure. Hutton came down hard on the fact 
that Gilligan had relied heavily on one source. But many experienced 
investigative reporters feel that while the two source rule should apply 
generally, when it comes to covering intelligence an exception can be 
made by experienced reporters. To have one high level intelligence 
source is no small achievement. Other reporters were also getting 
worried source reports from within the intelligence service on the same 
grounds.72 If the hurdle was set at two sources it would dramatically 
restrict coverage of this important subject of the intelligence services. 
If we have learnt any thing from war on terror it is that intelligence 
services are politically influenced and capable of making major errors. 
They, almost more than any other organization, need the scrutiny of 
the investigative reporter to make sure they do not abuse their 
exclusive powers. 
 
No better can this be demonstrated than by the difficulty journalists 
have in establishing whether MI5 knew of links between the terror cell 
that were caught making a fertilizer bomb and the 7/7 suicide 
bombers. MI5’s briefings in late 2005 that Mohammed Siddique Khan, 
the leader of the 7/7 bombers had been identified months before the 
suicide bombings only on the ‘periphery’ of the fertilizer bomb cell.73 It 
now looks like the Police and MI5 had many more leads on Khan than 
they admitted. This leaves the question – are they hiding other key 
facts. Should MI5 have prevented 7/7? 
 
As Gilligan pointed out there are many stories that we simply have not 
been able to investigate. “What has happened on Diego Garcia?” he 
                                                 
71  ‘On the Ropes’, BBC Radio4, 24 April 2007 
72 On the brink of war: The spies' revolt MI6 and CIA: the new enemy within” by Paul Lashmar and 
Raymond Whitaker, Independent on Sunday   09/02/2003 
73 The author of this chapter experienced misleading information from official sources on the knowledge 
of Khan. 
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asks.74 The British protectorate of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is 
a secret base and journalists have no access. It also has an air base 
and military facilities. It has been associated with the rendition 
operations. But no one has been able to establish what the base has 
been used for and whether terror suspects have been held there. 
 
Four years on, how does Gilligan’s story, perhaps the best 
remembered piece of journalism so far in the war on terror, stand the 
test of time? Now, few would seriously contest his central point that 
the Government’s dossier claiming Iraq had WMD was ‘sexed up’. As 
Gilligan pointed out in an interview for this chapter, the Government in 
their initial counterattack claimed to be angry because he accused it of 
lying. This he points out he never did. The obvious implication is that 
the attack on Gilligan was a device to frighten the BBC and curtail 
criticism. It may have worked.  
 
And that bring us onto a key point. One overarching observation has 
to be made about the media reporting of the war on terror. Even if you 
have high quality and consistent reporting, investigative or otherwise, 
that shows that a government has misled the public and made errors 
of judgement on a truly epic scale, if the executive has an 
overwhelming electoral majority it can withstand such criticism. 
 
In the UK, if the quality of reporting has been varied over the last six 
years, good journalists including investigative journalists made a 
compelling case that Prime Minister Blair and his successors in 
government have committed the most serious foreign policy disaster 
certainly since Suez. Reporters have shown conclusively that Blair and 
his cabinet were either fools or knaves in the way we were enrolled 
into the war on terror. Even now it is hard to discern whether Blair did 
or did not believe that there was WMD in Iraq. Yet the Labour 
Government remains in power, Tony Blair has chosen his own time to 
retire. You could equally say the same for President Bush in the United 
States. Here we have sobering examples of the limitations on the 
power of the media at a point when it was most crucial. 
 
                                                 
74 Gilligan, Andrew telephone interview by Lashmar, Paul (2007).  
